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Abstract- Negotiation can be regarded as playing a game with
certain rules. If the rules change, the game has to be played
differently. Compared to traditional markets, electronic
markets can have fundamentally different characteristics such
as cost structure or the level of transparency. These differences
have already stimulated the tremendous success of one breed of
electronic market negotiations: auctions. But auctions offer only
limited support for the negotiations that will be necessary in
more differentiated markets for complex goods and services.
This paper relates the implications of specific electronic market
characteristics to the effectiveness of major types of
negotiations. The analysis reveals why bidding protocols
currently dominate bargaining protocols and suggests that
future negotiation support beyond auctions should be based on
integrative multilateral protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Negotiations have been identified as critical coordination
mechanisms for the interaction of providers and consumers
in future electronic markets that transcend the selling of
uniform goods [1]. This has inspired research with origins in
the area of negotiation science [2],[3], autonomous agents
[4],[5], and auctions [6]. However the primary focus of these
research efforts is on the automation or extension of existing
negotiation protocols. More fundamental questions have
been neglected so far.
A broad variety of negotiation protocols has evolved in
traditional markets. What are the reasons that some types of
protocols have not been implemented in electronic markets?
Are all traditional negotiation protocols promising candidates
for electronic markets or are there protocol types that are
more efficient due to certain characteristics of electronic
markets?
A study of the interdependencies between economical
characteristics of electronic markets and features of negotia-
tion processes can provide insight into this issue and outline
future research. It turns out, that first, one can expect the
number of negotiated agreements to increase in electronic
markets. Second, protocols with multilateral character seem
to be suited especially to benefit from electronic market
characteristics. Third, missing formalisations of the integra-
tive negotiation process currently prevent fully automated
implementations and will probably continue to do so in the
future.
To present these conclusions, this paper is organised in the
following way: Section II briefly introduces negotiations as
part of the agreement phase of business transactions and
provides a basic classification of negotiation protocols.
Section III analyses major characteristics of electronic
markets. These characteristics are then used in Section IV to
specify a need for negotiations in electronic markets and in
Section V to examine the implications for processes in the
agreement phase. In Section VI we review our findings based
on negotiation support that is currently available in electronic
markets. Finally, Section VII discusses conclusions of this
assessment and our future direction of research.
Throughout this paper we will postulate hypotheses to
summarise our findings.
II. AGREEMENT PHASE
Four phases of interaction can be identified in business
transactions [7]:
• Knowledge (gathering information concerning prod-
ucts, market participants etc.)
• Intention (specifying supply and demand with offers
to buy etc.)
• Agreement (identifying the terms and conditions of
the transaction and signing a contract)
• Settlement (execution of the agreed-upon contract,
payment, post-sales support etc.)
Each phase consists of several interaction processes. The
interface between the intention and the agreement phase is an
offer. If at least one party submits an offer, the agreement
phase is initiated. In the simplest case another party merely
has to accept this offer in order to reach an agreement. In
case of an agreement the transition to the settlement phase is
marked by a signed contract.
In the following sections, processes in the agreement
phase are examined in more detail. For one of these proc-
esses – negotiation - a classification is provided.
A. Processes in the agreement phase
We identify the following high-level processes to be part
of the agreement phase. Matching is the initial process that
identifies candidate offers for an agreement. Input to the
matching process is either a set of requirements (constraints
and preferences identified in the information phase) paired
with a number of offers or a set of offers-to-buy and offers-
to-sell. Correspondingly the output is either a set of offers
that fulfil the constraints or matching offers with high
agreement potential. Hence matchmaking provides data sets
for the next step: scoring.
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Figure 1: Processes in the agreement phase [8]
In the scoring process the set of matching offers is evalu-
ated and ranked to determine the best offer. The ranking can
be a result of comparing single attributes such as price or of
more complex evaluations based, for instance, on multi-
attribute utility theory [9]. If a party is satisfied with the best
offer, signing a contract by accepting the offer completes the
agreement phase.
Negotiating takes place when, based on the offers made in
the intention phase, an agreement cannot be reached or the
agreement has potential for optimisation and the parties
intending to carry out the transaction want to discuss their
offers. From the perspective of one party, negotiating is
characterised by the modification of one’s own offer or the
efforts to change another party’s offer. After the negotiation
process, scoring can be initiated again to compare the negoti-
ated agreement with other potential agreements.
If after scoring or after the negotiating process an agree-
ment has still not been reached, the entire agreement phase
can be restarted, for instance, by preparing new offers in the
intention phase or reviewing the initial requirements in the
knowledge phase.
B. Classification of negotiations
Many attributes can be used to classify negotiations [10].
For the purpose of this paper the following attributes are of
primary interest:
• Distributive versus integrative negotiations. In dis-
tributive negotiations one issue is subject to negotia-
tion and the parties involved have opposing interests.
One party tries to minimise (to give as little as possi-
ble) and the other party tries to maximise (to receive
as much as possible). Distributive negotiations are
also characterised as ‘win-lose’ negotiations. The
more one party gets, the less the other party gets. In
integrative negotiations multiple issues are negotiated
and the parties involved have different preferences
towards these issues. Two parties want for example to
buy a company, but one is interested primarily in the
human capital whereas the other is interested in the
patent portfolio. These variant valuations can be ex-
ploited to find an agreement with joint gains for both
parties. If their preferences are the same across multi-
ple issues, the negotiation remains distributive until
opposing interests are identified. In such a case, both
parties can realise gains; thus another name for this
class of negotiations is ‘win-win’ negotiations [11].
• Bilateral versus multilateral negotiations. This char-
acterisation of negotiations refers to the numbers of
parties participating in the negotiation. Only two par-
ties participate in bilateral negotiations, whereas in
multilateral negotiations either the one-to-many or
many-to-many negotiation situation applies. In addi-
tion, parties involved in multilateral negotiations can
typically inspect offers from other parties (unless the
offers are intentionally sealed). Similarly, multilateral
negotiations are also characterised as public competi-
tive negotiations, whereas bilateral negotiations have
a private character and are therefore often referred to
as cooperative negotiations.
Combinations of attributes within this classification can be
used for a high-level design of negotiation protocols. A
protocol for negotiations defines the rules by which parties
come to agreements. We will compare the two most com-
monly used protocol families (shaded areas in Figure 2)
multilateral distributive negotiations (bidding) and bilateral
integrative negotiations (bargaining) in more detail later in
this paper.
A classification is not necessarily persistent during a real
negotiation process. An integrative negotiation can be re-
duced to a distributive negotiation if only one issue is sub-
jected to discussion and all other issues are temporarily fixed.
On the other hand a distributive negotiation can be extended
to an integrative negotiation by adding issues to the discus-
sion.
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Figure 2: Types of negotiations
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRONIC MARKETS
Electronic markets are information systems that coordinate
business transactions through the forces of supply and
demand [12]. From an economics perspective, electronic
markets can, but do not necessarily have to, differ funda-
mentally from traditional markets. The following primary
characteristics are relevant to the discussion in this paper:
• Virtuality. Electronic markets are virtual markets,
which means that the objects of transactions and mar-
ket participants do not have to be physically present.
Participation in virtual markets can be both synchro-
nous and asynchronous. It is not necessary for con-
sumers and providers to meet at the same time. Par-
ticipants might also use software agents to act on their
behalf or to provide notification of events. Accord-
ingly, virtual markets do not generally incur return
costs, because goods do not have to be transported
back and forth [13].
• Transparency. Electronic markets can be completely
transparent due to zero or marginal search costs [14].
Market transparency is defined as the ability of mar-
ket participants to observe information about the
trading process. Information can be related to current
or past prices, quotes, offers, volume and the identi-
ties and motivations of market participants. This in-
formation in electronic markets is available through
advanced search and comparison services such as
shopping agents or directories. Furthermore electronic
transactions multiply the opportunities to collect data
about consumers’ purchasing behaviour. Sources of
information range from records of online payments to
logs of site visits and page views1.
• Size. An important characteristic of electronic markets
is that they are, in principle, not limited to political or
regional borders, enabling trade with partners from all
over the world. The entry thresholds for the market
are generally low, which increases the number of po-
tential trade partners significantly compared to tradi-
tional markets. It has to be considered though that
partners might be located in another country with a
different culture, different trade customs etc. [15],
which can heighten the complexity of interaction.
• Cost. The costs for managing interactions (transaction
costs such as advertising, searching potential trade
partners and subsequent coordination) are generally
low due to a high degree of automation and the cheap
connectivity of the Internet [16]. In the early devel-
opment stages of electronic markets, switching costs
for consumers were rather high due to significant
setup costs for electronic transactions (connections to
proprietary market systems such as SABRE or
Apollo). These costs have decreased as the Internet
                                                          
1
 The future availability of personalised consumer information is difficult
to estimate because of the current discussion regarding privacy in the
Internet.
and its related standards (TCP/IP, HTTP, XML etc.)
homogenise the access channels. Once companies
have connected to the Internet they can switch mar-
kets and providers at virtually no cost from a technical
point of view (costs might still be imposed by system
providers, e.g. for client software or registration).
IV. NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Given the characteristics of electronic markets an impor-
tant question is whether we can expect to see more or fewer
agreements that are based on negotiations in electronic
markets compared to traditional markets.
In general, there are many reasons already prevalent in
traditional markets to negotiate the price as well as terms and
conditions of a transaction, opposed to fixed offering. It is,
for instance, very difficult to fix a price for transactions that
are unique (e.g. power plants), are subject to diverse con-
sumer valuations (e.g. fashion goods, art), are perishable (e.g.
food, newspaper advertisements) or that face very dynamic
demand (e.g. network bandwidth, electricity).
Key to a specific view of the need for negotiations in
electronic markets are low transaction costs and especially
low search costs. If search costs for price information are
zero, we can expect that consumers enjoy perfect price
information. This typically leads to price wars. Providers
then have the following alternatives: make price comparisons
more difficult, differentiate their products, or create markets
that emphasise product information over price information
[17]. As we will show now, all of these strategies are incom-
patible with advertising fixed offers.
To impede price comparisons basically means to reintro-
duce search costs. Typically this can be done by charging
different prices to different consumers for the same transac-
tion. Perfect price discrimination achieves this through
exploiting differences in consumer valuations. This discrimi-
nation strategy requires detailed consumer information,
customised products and independent billing. Such condi-
tions can occur in electronic markets [18]. Hence price
discrimination requires knowledge about the situation-
specific individual consumer valuations, which cannot be
analysed based on fixed offers.
By differentiating horizontally or vertically, providers can
decrease the substitutability of their products/services and
customise offers to the requirements of specific consumers or
market segments (mass customisation). In such a market it is
possible for providers to extract consumer surplus even
among consumers who have perfect price information. This
is the case because consumers tend to remain loyal to provid-
ers of products and services that best match their require-
ments. With a differentiation strategy, fixed pricing is again
rarely possible because in the extreme case every transaction
is unique and non-repetitive.
Markets that emphasise product information steer consum-
ers to the provider with the best offer. Providers might even
be able to charge for this service, which then raises the entry
barrier for competitors. But if product information dominates
price information, then it is again advantageous for providers
to omit price information completely because individual
prices are always more efficient than uniform pricing (as has
been shown by Phlips in [19]).
A specific discussion is necessary regarding markets for
commodities. There are not many options to differentiate or
emphasise product information for mass-marketed consumer
products such as CDs or books - the online selling of com-
modities is though often bundled with add-on services (e.g.
sound samples or gift-wrapping). But there is also a shift
towards negotiated agreements in electronic markets driven
by new possibilities to increase consumer power. Services
such as the buyer consortium Accompany [20] accumulate
demand in order to negotiate better prices. This is, because of
minimal interaction cost, also effective for low-value goods.
The conclusion therefore is that we can expect more nego-
tiations to take place in the agreement phase of electronic
markets than in traditional markets. Supporting electronic
negotiations is therefore not only a necessity but also a
critical success factor for many markets, which may face
price wars and exiting providers.
Hypothesis: The number of negotiated agreements will
increase in electronic markets.
The market for airline tickets is the most popular and most
intensively studied example of an electronic market that
displays a pattern of virtualisation, price wars and differen-
tiation/discrimination strategies. Currently it is easy to search
for convenient flights but finding the best rate is cumbersome
because the number of different tariffs is huge. Airlines
deliberately introduced this discriminated price structure
(early reservation discounts, frequent flyer bonus, weekend
tariffs etc.) to reduce market transparency after a phase of
open price competition [21].
Just recently the next level of dynamic offering was intro-
duced to the market. After airlines started to run auctions for
unsold tickets, services such as Priceline [22] now allow
consumers to specify the amount they are willing to pay for a
ticket. Then Priceline will query the market to see if an
airline is willing to accept this price. Differentiation strate-
gies are also manifested in new bundled offers that for
instance combine business class tickets with free rental cars.
This clearly shows that the market is constantly moving
towards more variable prices and more differentiated offers,
resulting in more negotiated agreements.
V. EFFECTS ON AGREEMENT PROCESSES
The specific characteristics of electronic markets not only
affect the likelihood of negotiations in general but also have
implications for the execution of agreement processes and
the sources of power in negotiations. In the following sec-
tions we develop several additional hypotheses regarding the
implications of electronic markets.
A. Implications for pre-negotiation processes
The characteristics of electronic markets can affect the
processes precedent to negotiations in the agreement phase in
the following way.
1) Matching: Because the number of potential trade part-
ners increases with the size of the market, the chances of
finding a closer match to the requirements specified are
higher. The matching process itself benefits from the virtual-
ity of the market because the process can be based solely on
the comparison of offer and request information without the
need to inspect transaction objects physically in order to
retrieve attributes for the matching. Several mechanisms
already exist to support the matching process (e.g. [23]),
allowing improvement of the situation at the beginning of
negotiations.
Hypothesis: Greater size and virtualisation are beneficial to
the matching process.
2) Scoring: The more information available in the market,
the better for the scoring process. Detailed information, for
instance about providers (history, references etc.) or the
range of service/product attribute values across the market
(e.g. warranties vary from 1 to 3 years), increases the number
of input parameters to be considered and reduces the uncer-
tainty about the decision to determine the best match.
Hypothesis: Transparency is beneficial to the scoring
process.
B. Implications for the negotiation process
The analysis in the previous section suggests that pre-
negotiation agreement processes generally benefit in the
context of electronic markets. If the execution of processes in
the pre-negotiation stage is already simplified, this also has
positive effects on the negotiation process itself simply
because the selection of potential agreement candidates is
more effective (matching results with better quality at lower
cost, scoring with higher accuracy and less uncertainty).
Compared to traditional markets, negotiations with a higher
agreement potential can be pursued and negotiations with no
zones of agreement are identified a priori. But this generic
benefit of electronic markets is, on the level of single char-
acteristics, biased towards the different types of negotiations.
In the following discussion we will focus on a comparison of
bargaining versus bidding with the goal to determine which
characteristic is most beneficial to which type of negotiation.
1) Bargaining: If personalised consumer information is
available to the extent that a provider organisation knows
about the preferences of its consumers, this is very favour-
able for the integrative negotiation process because the
exchange of preference information is a necessary require-
ment [24].
If greater size results in a higher number of agreement
candidates, bargaining is more complex because it requires
comparing multiple preference profiles and managing multi-
ple simultaneous bilateral negotiation sessions.
With regard to costs, the fact that transaction costs are low
is not critical for bargaining because integrative negotiations
do not rely on high quantities of standardised simple interac-
tions such as price bids in distributive negotiations. Interac-
tions in integrative negotiations are much more unstructured
(inquiries, positional statements, challenges etc.) and costs
are mostly associated with the decision process (see Section
VI). In addition, low costs for setting up a transaction and
switching providers also allow short-term trade relationships,
which are not based on long-term mutual commitments but
are established dynamically. Parties therefore might not have
previous experience or make further deals with each other.
Traditional strong arguments for concessions such as past
compromises or linking with potential future deals are
therefore weaker in an electronic market if short-term rela-
tionships are prevalent. This will make negotiations less
amicable, which is not favourable for integrative negotiations
regarding their joint-problem solving nature.
Hypothesis: Bargaining benefits especially from high
transparency.
2) Bidding: Multilateral distributive protocols are repre-
sented by auctions. Auctions benefit from the size of elec-
tronic markets because they rely on competition. With an
increasing number of competing consumers and providers,
negotiating parties are forced to unveil their true valuations
and the resolved prices are more efficient than in traditional
bilateral negotiations [25]. Participants also benefit directly
from low transaction costs. Whereas providers generally
have to pay setup costs and a proportional sales fee, the
participation of consumers is free, which again amplifies the
size factor. Searching for the right auction item is cheap and
already supported by various search engines and agents (e.g.
AuctionWatch [26]). As multilateral protocols, electronic
auctions also benefit from virtuality because the potentially
high number of participants are not required to be at the same
place at the same time. High transparency on the other hand
is not crucial in electronic auctions because a rational strat-
egy for bidding in typical electronic auction protocols such
as the Dutch or Vickrey auction is only dependent on a
bidder’s internal reservation price. Determination of the
reservation price does benefit from high transparency. But
this task is usually performed in the knowledge or intention
phase and, as will be shown in Section V.C.2 transparency
can even have a negative impact on the bidding process.
Hypothesis: Bidding benefits especially from greater size,
low transaction costs, and virtuality.
C. Implications for negotiation power
We can informally define power in negotiations as the
ability to influence the other party in a way that contributes
to the achievement of personal goals in a negotiation.
In business negotiations the following sources of power2
might be used [27]:
• Resource control (money, time, critical services or
human capital)
• Information power (ability to assemble information
that supports a position, respect, or credibility)
• Personal power (attractiveness, emotion, integrity,
persistence and tenacity)
Sources of power are applied in negotiations, for instance,
to persuade or to put pressure on the other party. But these
sources of power call for special consideration in an elec-
tronic market setting. Negotiation power is a relational
concept. One party tries to gain a power advantage in a
certain area.
In Section IV, an example for increased consumer nego-
tiation power in electronic markets was introduced as an
argument to support the increased likelihood of negotiations.
The source of greater negotiation power in the example of
buyer consortia is based on the accumulation and coordina-
tion of demand, leading to an increase of the resource con-
trolled (in this case consumer money).
It is difficult though, to gain information power (having
more or better information than the other party) if the cost of
searching for information is low. In markets with high
transparency we can assume that both parties always have
the same level of information. Therefore it will be very
difficult to gain information power.
As electronic markets are virtual exchanges, sources of
personal power are not present. Current technology does not
yet provide any means of conveying attractiveness or anger,
for example, other than through the wording used in elec-
tronic mails. The desired high degree of automation is also
not favourable for expressing personal power because the
main goal of automation is to reduce personal involvement.
Hypothesis: Better means to coordinate resource control
lead to stronger consumer negotiation power -
but sources of information and personal power
are vanishing in electronic markets.
This again has biased implications for the negotiation pro-
cesses.
1) Bargaining: Information power is not critical in the
joint problem-solving effort of integrative negotiations. More
important is to share any kind of knowledge that leads to
pareto-optimal solutions. On the other hand personal power
has historically played an important role in traditional bar-
gaining, especially in face-to-face negotiations. But research
[28] indicates that avoidance of threats, positional statements
and other kinds of messages related to personal power
promote integrative solutions.
                                                          
2 Two other sources of power are identified: legitimate power and one’s
location in the organisational structure. These sources are not relevant in
the context of non-hierarchical market coordination.
Hypothesis: Lack of personal power is beneficial to bar-
gaining solutions.
2) Bidding: For bidding, information power is important.
Given better information than one’s competitors, a partici-
pant might have a more accurate estimate of the reservation
price and therefore a reduced risk of paying too much. If
information power is not achievable, the common value
assumption holds. All bidders have the same valuation
(reservation price) and the winner has to pay a price higher
than the common valuation, suffering the winner’s curse
[29]. This will deteriorate incentives for participation. Per-
sonal power however does not matter for bidding because the
interaction is restricted to the submission of price bids.
Hypothesis: Lack of information power is disadvantageous
for bidding participation.
VI. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATION SUPPORT
In this section we will discuss briefly the existing support
for electronic negotiations in order to review the hypothetical
implications for negotiation processes derived in the previous
sections.
From a current perspective, support for electronic negotia-
tions is limited to distributive negotiations and, more specifi-
cally, to bidding [30]. The most successful and popular
application of bidding is the electronic auction. Today, large
transaction volumes in electronic markets are coordinated via
auctions in business-to-consumer as well as business-to-
business scenarios. Successful examples include auctions for
bandwidth or procurement. Many variations of protocols are
used (e.g. [31]). Less ubiquitous types of bidding are imple-
mented based on autonomous agents (e.g. the Kasbah project
[32]). These agents incorporate a specification of the nego-
tiation strategy (risk friendly, risk averse) used in the nego-
tiation with competing agents that act on behalf of other
market participants.
The fact that bidding dominates electronic markets
whereas applications of bargaining are missing completely
provides a high-level backing for the hypotheses we derived.
Figure 3 summarises the biased effects of electronic markets
on bidding and bargaining.
Bidding benefits more from the factors size, cost and vir-
tuality, whereas only one factor is more favourable for
bargaining: transparency. Based on this analysis and assum-
ing equal power of the impacts, protocols based on bidding
seem to be better suited for electronic markets than protocols
based on bargaining.
This is strengthened by the fact that the characteristics of
greater size and low transaction cost are a reality in many
markets today. We reasoned in Section IV that high transpar-
ency is unstable because providers have an incentive to
reduce transparency if consumers enjoy perfect information.
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Figure 3: Biased effects of electronic markets
Figure 3 suggests very generic arguments that favour mul-
tilateral integrative protocols as suitable electronic market
negotiation protocols on a macro-market level. The choice
and design of a protocol for a single market scenario will
also be driven by other considerations such as the nature of
the traded product (value, configuration space etc.).
There is another reason why bidding currently dominates
bargaining, which we denote as the ‘formalisation frontier’.
The goal of complete automation is the execution of tasks
with no human intervention. To investigate the degree of
possible automation necessary, aspects such as formalisation
of the task and sufficient aspects such as the efficiency of
automated processing versus human execution have to be
considered [33]. Regarding formalisation, the decision tasks
within the respective negotiation processes are especially
critical.
It is possible to host bidding services in a completely
automated way because formalisations for the decision task
have been developed: the winning bid is the one with the
lowest, second-highest or highest price (depending on the
type of auction). Even for more complex scenarios (bids on
price and quantity, combinatorial auctions) clearing algo-
rithms have been developed [34],[35]. Participation in the
bidding process (monitoring bids, reacting on outbids etc.) is,
again depending on the type of auction, also automisable
with software agents (e.g. eBay’s proxy bidding). This is the
case, for instance, when there is only one rational strategy to
bid (see above). Hence, only one decision task cannot be
formalised in an efficient manner: the determination of the
maximum bid (the reservation price).
Typically, negotiations demand decisions under uncer-
tainty (unknown reservation price of the other party, possi-
bility for future concessions from the other party etc.).
Hardly ever can decisions such as the determination of the
reservation price be isolated from a number of interdepend-
ent business parameters (e.g. the level of stock or available
manufacturing capacity) or other related decisions (in real
estate scenarios there might be concurrent negotiations
between a buyer/seller and buyer/bank). In the case of
bidding, this critical decision usually takes place in the
knowledge or intention phase and is therefore beyond the
scope of the agreement process.
Due to its integrative character, the situation is more com-
plex for bargaining. If multiple attributes are subject to
discussion and the negotiating parties have different prefer-
ences towards these issues, the task to host a service that
determines and selects the most efficient agreement is not
trivial. This is especially the case if the bargaining situation
is ill structured (incompatible offers, not all attributes are
known a priori, there are many non-quantifiable attributes
etc.) and preferences are subject to change. The achievement
of win-win solutions might also require suggesting creative
alternative solutions, potentially with new attributes outside
the initial agreement zone.
For these reasons, decision tasks in the bargaining process
are much more difficult to formalise than in the bidding
process and therefore much more difficult to automate.
Kersten and Noronha [36] even question completely the
possibility of achieving complete automation for integrative
negotiations and argue for a combination of decision support
and software agents.
But the cost reduction achievable with a high degree of
automation is one of the necessary success factors for elec-
tronic markets. Nobody has an incentive to participate in a
market where the cost of coordination is higher than the
improved efficiency of the agreements it provides. This
limits negotiations with high coordination costs to markets
for high-value transactions, where the potential for optimis-
ing agreements is correspondingly high. Therefore the lack
of formalisation for integrative negotiations currently im-
pedes implementations in electronic markets- and will do so
in the future, unless either formalisations can be found or the
scope of electronic markets is extended to goods of higher
value, which enables agreement processes with human
intervention.
VII. SUMMARY
On the basis of fundamental characteristics of electronic
markets, we demonstrated that negotiations are not only
needed in electronic markets but also that product differen-
tiation, price discrimination and buyer accumulation strate-
gies will lead to even more negotiated agreements than in
traditional markets. This can already be verified using the
example of the airline flight market.
However the characteristics of electronic markets also
have an impact on negotiations and other processes in the
agreement phase of electronic transactions. It is our belief
that these agreement processes should, in general, be easier
to execute in an electronic market with biased impacts on the
negotiation process itself. We postulated these findings in
several hypotheses, which have to be evaluated in the future,
based on the performance of real agreement processes in
electronic markets. The tremendous success of electronic
auctions provides early support of one of our main argu-
ments: negotiations based on bidding especially benefit from
electronic market characteristics.
Given that integrative negotiations are needed in electronic
markets we come to the conclusion that to support these
kinds of negotiations is better not to implement pure bar-
gaining but to use integrative negotiation protocols that share
the multilateral character with bidding protocols. Integrative
multilateral protocols have to our knowledge not been
considered so far for use in electronic markets. But based on
the findings presented in this paper, they seem to be a prom-
ising candidate for negotiation support in differentiated
markets for complex products and services. However, the
conclusion of this analysis is not that there is no space for
distributive protocols in the future. Distributive negotiations
will continue to play an important role in electronic markets,
but it is our belief, that in comparison to traditional markets,
there will be a shift towards more integrative negotiations.
One of the challenges to the design of multilateral integra-
tive protocols was identified in this paper as the formalisa-
tion frontier. Assuming that complete automation is not
feasible, the design has to incorporate a smooth transition
from automisable processes (e.g. matching) to the core
negotiation activity, which relies to some extent on human
intervention.
Our next step is to design such a negotiation protocol and
to combine it with the matchmaking and scoring facilities
that have already been developed as part of the virtual
marketplace project [37]. These facilities exploit the benefits
of electronic markets in the pre-negotiation stage. The
envisioned extension of the marketplace will eventually
result in an integrated framework for agreement processes
that support multi-dimensional negotiations beyond simple
discussions of price.
In addition, we will extend this analysis to a more detailed
framework that maps specific business models to criteria for
the selection and design of negotiation protocols.
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